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JURISDICTION
Appellants Robert Low, Joel Palmer, Julia Redd and Albert Steele (collectively
referred to as the "Citizens") appeal the trial court's ruling granting in part the motion for
summary judgment filed by Appellees City of Monticello ("City") and K. Dale Black,
Douglas Allen, Julie Bronson, Kim Burtenshaw, Clyde Christensen, Evan Lowry and
C. Trent Schaffer ("City Employees") (collectively referred to as the "City Defendants").
The Citizens also appeal the trial court's denial of the their cross-motion for partial
summary judgment. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)0).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law that the City's
decision to purchase an electric power distribution system was administrative instead of
legislative? (R. at 1049, pgs. 34-40.)
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review "grants of summary judgments under
the 'correctness' standard, affording the trial court's legal conclusions no deference."
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Neiderhauser
Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
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Issue. Did the trial court err in alternatively concluding as a matter of law that
submitting the proposed purchase of the system to the public for a referendum vote would
violate the United States and Utah Constitutions? (R. at 1049, pg. 40 n.10.)
Standard of Review. Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law.
Cache County v. Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 922 P.2d 758, 766
(Utah 1996). Courts of appeal review "grants of summary judgments under the
"correctness' standard, affording the trial court's legal conclusions no deference." Palmer
v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Neiderhauser Builders &
Dev. Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
Issue. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law that the City
Defendants did not violate the Utah Municipal Bond Act, Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-1, et
seq. ("Municipal Bond Act")? (R. at 1049, pgs. 23-34.)
Standard of Review. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law. Lieber
v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.y Inc., 2000 UT 90, ^f 7. Courts of appeal review "grants of
summary judgments under the 'correctness' standard, affording the trial court's legal
conclusions no deference." Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992)).
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Issue. Did the trial court err in alternatively concluding as a matter of law that: 1)
the City Defendants are immune from the Citizens' attempt to enjoin them from violating
the Municipal Bond Act (R. at 1049, pg. 23 n.7); 2) the Citizens' attempt to enjoin the
City Defendants from violating the Municipal Bond Act is not ripe (R. at 1049, pg. 23
n.7); and 3) the Citizens lack standing to seek an injunction prohibiting the City
Defendants from violating the Municipal Bond Act (R. at 1049, pg. 23 n.7)?
Standard of Review. Courts of appeal review "grants of summary judgments under
the 'correctness' standard, affording the trial court's legal conclusions no deference."
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct App. 1995) (citing Neiderhauser
Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
GOVERNING LAW
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are of central importance to
the outcome of this appeal and are attached in their entirety in the Addendum: United
States Constitution, Art. 1, § 10; Utah Constitution, Art. L, § 18; Utah Code Ann. §1114-21; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-16. The following provisions are also determinative
of the outcome of this appeal but their meaning is undisputed: Utah Constitution, Art. VI,
§ 1; Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-102; and Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-610. They too are
attached in their entirety in the Addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

This case involves a decision by the City Defendants to purchase an electric
distribution system from a private company which had provided electricity to the City's
residents for 20 years. The Citizens filed this action seeking to enjoin the City from
improperly financing the purchase after excluding City residents from participating in
discussions relating to the purchase in open, properly scheduled meetings, failing to
disclose to them the terms of the proposed financing as required by statute and denying
them their statutory right to vote on the issue pursuant to a referendum. The City
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the Citizens'
claims as a matter of law. The Citizens opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment asking the trial court disclose the contents of the closed meetings to
the public and to declare that the purchase of the system is a legislative act and is
therefore required to be put to a vote by the residents of the City before it may occur.
Following briefing and oral argument done on an expedited schedule, the trial court
granted the Citizens' motion in part and ordered that the transcripts of several of the
closed meetings be revealed to the public. However, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City Defendants on the Citizens' remaining claims. The Citizens
appeal the trial court's dismissal of those claims.
4

B.

Statement of Facts.

In 1979, Monticello City sold its electrical distribution system to a private entity
but retained an option to repurchase it for fair market value in January of 2000. (R. at
118, % 1.) On September 8, 1997, the City Council passed Resolution 1997-6 in which it
expressed an intent to consider repurchasing the system and to determine the feasibility of
such an undertaking. (R. at 1049, pg. 3, ^ 3; R. at 118-19, ^ 3.) As part of its
investigation into whether it should purchase the system, the City began discussing with
the owner what the fair market value of the system was. (R. at 119, ^f 4.) While the City
and the owner disputed who would be responsible for paying miscellaneous closing costs,
separation costs, and fees associated with the purchase, they agreed the fair market value
of the system was $1,315,271. (R. at 123, % 21; R. at 1049, pg. 5, \ 21.) The City still
had not entered into any agreement to purchase the system at this time but was still
debating whether to do so or not. (R. at 1049, pg. 5, ^} 21.) In further evaluating an
eventual decision, the City Council conducted a feasibility analysis. That analysis
estimated what the yearly costs and revenues of the system would be, but because the
1979 contract giving the City the option to repurchase the system expressly stated the
price would be its fair market value, its only purpose was to help the City to determine
whether purchasing the system might be beneficial to the City, not how much the City
should pay for it. (R. at 1049, pg. 5, \ 22; R. at 123, \ 22.)
5

Over the course of the next several years, the City Council met 16 times in closed
sessions to discuss whether purchasing the system was feasible, whether it would be good
for the City, to ask the opinion of others on the subject, and to determine how to present
the information on whether or not to purchase the system to City residents at scheduled
public meetings. (R. at 1049, pg. 6, ^f 25.) Those meetings took place on the following
dates: August 27, 1997; January 14, 1998; January 28, 1998; December 9, 1998; January
13, 1999; January 27, 1999; February 10, 1999; April 14, 1999; May 26, 1999; September
8, 1999; October 13, 1999; February 9, 2000; February 23, 2000; March 1, 2000; March
12, 2000; and April 20, 2000. (R. at 124, ^ 26; R. at 1049, pg. 6,1[ 26.) The minutes for
most of those meetings state the reason for closing them was to discuss strategies in
purchasing the real property of the system. (R. at 124, ^f 27.) That is because Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-5(1 )(a)(iv) only allows meetings to be closed to the public where the City
Council "discuss[es] the purchase, exchange, or lease of real property . . . "

The

proposed purchase, however, was for the entire system, which included not only real
property but equipment and other tangible and intangible assets as well. The proposed
purchase was for the system as a whole, not its real property.

1

There are other reasons the governing body of a municipality may close a session
but they are not applicable to this case and were not argued below.
6

The City Council's decision to close the meetings was also inappropriate because
the issues they discussed in those meetings included not only the supposed "purchase of
real property," but also whether it was a good idea to purchase the system at all, what
challenges the City would face in owning its own electric distribution system, the
feasibility of the City undertaking such a burden and how to most favorably present
information about the proposed purchase to City residents. (R. at 1049, pgs. 6-7, ^ 27.)
One of the City Council members admitted "Right at the outset I didn't feel like there was
any need to those sessions and have strategy sessions . . . because there was nobody going
to bid against us. It was our option to either buy the system back or let them sign another
20-year contract with us." (R. at 1049, pg. 7, If 28.) The City Council also
misrepresented in the minutes what they discussed behind closed doors. On one
occasion, the description in the minutes stated they discussed only pending litigation.
However, recorded tapes of that closed session show they also discussed the purchase of
the system. (R. at 1049, pgs. 6-7, ^ 27.)
Over the course of time, numerous City residents raised objections to the proposed
purchase. (R. at 125,^31; R. at 126,ffif33-34.) Some urged the City Council to submit
the decision to a public vote. The City Council, however, declined. (R. at 127, ^ 35.)
Consequently, the Citizens presented a petition to the City Council on March 22, 2000
signed by approximately 270 City residents encouraging the City to hold an election on
7

the issue. (R. at 127, % 36.) The City Council again refused and instead passed
Resolution 2000-2 formally exercising the option to purchase the system. (R. at 127, ^|
36.)
On April 6, 2000, the City Council adopted Resolution 2000-3, which authorized
the City to issue Electric Revenue Bonds to pay for the purchase. The resolution
specified the principal amount of the bonds to be approximately $3 million and the
interest rate to be 6.75% for a period of 26 years. (R. at 120-21, pg. Tf 12.) Just under a
week later, the City gave the public notice of its intention to issue bonds to finance the
purchase. (R. at 120, 11.) Consistent with Resolution 2000-3, the notice stated the
principal amount of the bonds would be just under $3 million and the maximum interest
rate would be 6.75%. (R. at 120-21, ^112.) This, however, was a misrepresentation to the
public of the principal and interest rate of the bonds. Contrary to both Resolution 2000-3
and the notice of intent, however, the City planned to bond only $2.3 million for the
purchase. Moreover, it could not have issued all of the bonds at the 6.75% rate on the
date of the anticipated closing because $1.3 million of the bonds did not qualify for tax
exempt status, which was required for that low rate. (R. at 1049, pg. 4, ^ 12.)
For this and other reasons, the San Juan County Clerk received eleven official
packets on April 14, 2000 petitioning City officials for a referendum vote on whether the
City should purchase the system. The clerk verified the signatures and certified that 355
8

of the 367 total were those of registered voters. (R. at 127, ^ 37.) The City Recorder
further verified that 349 of the signatures were those of registered voters who lived in the
City. (R. at 127, ^ 38.) The City Recorder concluded the number of signatures exceeded
the amount necessary to submit the issue to a vote and the City Attorney prepared the
ballot title for the proposed referendum. (R. at 127-28,ffi[38-39.) However, the City
Recorder subsequently withdrew the vote from the public and informed City residents of
the decision. (R. at 128, ^ 40.)
Before the City Recorder informed the Citizens the issue would not be submitted
to a vote, the City attempted to enter into a purchase lease agreement with Zion's Bank,
which would have mooted the question of the pending referendum. (R. at 1049, pg. 7, <|
40.) City Council member Trent Schaffer investigated this type of alternative funding
without seeking the approval of the City Council in a formal City Council meeting. (R. at
1049, pg. 4, Tj 14.) The purchase lease agreement would have accrued interest at the rate
of 8.27%, would have been for twenty years and was never formally noticed to the
citizens of the City. This was a method for the City to purchase the electric distribution
system despite the pending referendum because it did not require an opinion from bond
counsel with respect to the legality of the financing. (R. at 1049, pgs. 4-5, ^ 14.) When
the Citizens filed this action calling to light this impermissible proposed arrangement, the
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City instead executed an Agreement to Extend Closing with the owner dated May 12,
2000 ("Contact"), which states:
If a REFERENDUM election relating to the purchase of the SYSTEM is held,
either as a result of the judicial disposition or by agreement of the parties to the
LITIGATION, and . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is upheld, then the closing shall be scheduled for 60 days from the date of
the election; or . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is rescinded, and/or the citizens vote that the City shall not purchase the
SYSTEM, then EMPIRE'S franchise under Ordnance 79-11 shall be extended for
20 years subject pursuant to Ordinance 79-11.
(R. at 200,1f 3.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The City Defendants violated numerous statutes in reaching their decision to
purchase the system, how much to pay for it and how to finance it. They conducted
multiple closed meetings which should have been open to the public (the minutes of
which were later ordered by the trial court to be disclosed), obtained financing for the
purchase without the necessary approval of the City Council in a regular meeting, and
falsely represented to City residents the amount the system would cost. When the
Citizens discovered these acts of malfeasance, they took the necessary steps to bring the
issue to the attention of City residents by way of a referendum. They presented to the
City Recorder a valid petition to put the proposed financing of the purchase to a vote by
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the citizens. The City Recorder certified the petition for vote and the City Council even
went so far as to prepare the ballot title.
When members of the City Council learned the citizens might defeat the proposed
financing if voted upon, they abruptly decided the issue was not the proper subject of a
referendum, withdrew the ballot and refused to put the issue to a vote. In acting this way,
the City Defendants attempted to deprive the Citizens of their basic right to be informed
about issues affecting them and to be involved in decisions relating to those issues. They
have repeatedly refused to comply with statutes regulating their conduct and protecting
not only the Citizens' rights, but those of every City resident. Their conduct should not
be tolerated and the City Defendants should be enjoined from purchasing the system
before giving the City residents an opportunity to express their will through a referendum
election. No matter how favorable to City residents the City Defendants believe the
purchase will be, they should not be allowed to take any action contrary to the will of the
people. To do so would be nothing less than tyranny. Consequently, the trial court
should be reversed and the City enjoined from purchasing the system until after registered
voters of the City have had the opportunity to cast their vote and approve such a purchase.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE CITY'S DECISION TO PURCHASE THE SYSTEM
WAS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTEAD OF LEGISLATIVE.

The City filed a counterclaim for declaratory action against the Citizens asking the
trial court to rule its decision to purchase the system was not subject to a referendum
under Utah law. They acknowledged in their motion for summary judgment that Article
VI, § 1 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-102 permit referenda on
legislative actions but argued the City's decision to purchase the system was
administrative and, therefore, was not subject to a referendum election. The parties did
not dispute the meaning of Article VI, § 1 or § 20A-7-102. The only issue was whether
the decision to purchase the system was legislative or administrative. Concluding as a
matter of law that the decision was administrative, the trial court granted the City's
motion on that claim. That conclusion is wrong.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the same issue in Keigley v. Bench, 63 P.2d
262 (Utah 1936) ("Keigley / ' ) , a case with facts nearly identical to those here. In
Keigley I, the governing body for the City of Provo passed a resolution authorizing the
2

The Utah Supreme Court issued another decision bearing the same name three
years later in Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939) ("Keigley IF). Keigley II was
not an appeal of Keigley L It too addressed the distinction between legislative and
administrative actions, but under a different set of facts. The trial court in this case failed
to address Keigley I in its opinion.
12

city to purchase $800,000 in revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring an electric power
distribution system. Id. at 263-64. Concerned citizens petitioned the city for a
referendum election on the issue. The city refused one, arguing the decision to purchase
the bonds was an administrative decision and was, therefore, not subject to such an
election. The citizens, therefore, filed an action seeking an order compelling the city to
conduct the election. Id. at 264.
The court discussed the distinction between legislative acts and administrative
acts. It stated, "[I]t is not the form but the substance of the municipal action which marks
the distinction . . . " Keigley /, 63 P.2d at 265. An administrative decision "is such an
order of the council as is ministerial or temporary in character . . . " Id. A legislative
action "prescribes a permanent rule of conduct of government." Id. Based in this
analysis, the court held the resolution:
was a legislative action. It was calculated to bind Provo City to contract for or
purchase an electric lighting and power system and to operate the same until the
revenue bonds were paid. The accomplishment of that end was a matter of public
policy of vital importance to the inhabitants of the city and as such is essentially
legislative in character. The approval or rejection of the resolution of May 22,
1936, was a proper subject matter for referendum.
Id
As in Keigley /, the City's decision to purchase the electric distribution system and
the means by which it intends to pay for it was a legislative action. It will bind the City to
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an obligation that will take 26 years to pay. It makes no difference that the bonds used to
purchase the system will be repaid with the revenue generated by it. The money will
come out of the pockets of the City residents since they are the ones who will be paying
for the power provided by the system and, therefore, the ones who will be producing the
revenue. Moreover, it will affect how much the residents pay for power and the quality of
their service, to mention only a few of the residents' concerns. See, e.g., Southern Cities
Distributing Co. v. Carter, 41 S.W.2d 1085 (Ark. 1931)(fixing of rates for public utility
by council of municipality is legislative act within constitutional provision authorizing
referendum). This affect will not be temporary in nature. It is not limited to a term of
years. It will be permanent. Moreover, it is not simply ministerial. Examples of a
ministerial decision are who would run the company, the length of his or her term and
what salary to pay. The decision to actually purchase the system will affect the manner in
which City residents will obtain power for an indefinite period. It is permanent in nature.
The City argued below that the Utah Constitution empowers cities to provide
utility services to its citizens and, therefore, gives it great latitude in determining how best
to fulfill this duty. While that may be true, the ways and means in which they decide to
do so is a legislative function. It is well established under Utah law that '"[a]cts . . .
making provisions of ways and means of accomplishment may be generally classified as

14

calling for the exercise of legislative power.'" Keigley v. Bench, 89 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah
1939) (citations omitted) ("Keigley IF).
As in Keigley I, the decision to purchase the system and the method used to pay for
it is clearly a matter of great importance to the citizens of City. The fact that 350 out of
2000 residents - 18% of the people living in the City - petitioned for a referendum
demonstrates the importance of this issue to the community.
Courts from other jurisdictions have also addressed the issue. They have
articulated the same standard for determining whether a resolution is a legislative and
therefore subject to challenge by referendum, or merely administrative. In Wennerstrom
v. City of Mesa, 821 P.2d 146 (Ariz. 1991), the court summarized the various tests for
distinguishing between administrative and legislative decisions. Citing MCQUILLAN ON
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,

the court stated, "[A]n act or resolution constituting a

declaration of public purpose and making provision for ways and means of its
accomplishment, it is generally legislative as distinguished from an act or resolution
which merely carries out the policy or purpose already declared by the legislative body."
Id. at 489. (emphasis in original omitted). In addition, "Actions relating to subjects of a
permanent and general character are usually regarded as legislative, and those providing
for subjects of a temporary and special character are regarded as administrative." Id.
Another standard has been stated as follows:
15

The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative proposition,
with respect to the initiative or referendum, has further been said to be
whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in
existence. The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it
prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if
it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or
some power superior to it.
Id.
The City argued below that the 1979 Ordinance granting the franchise and
providing for the option to renew or purchase after twenty years constituted the legislative
action and that the City's exercise of that right to purchase twenty years later is merely
administrative. This assertion is in error. The 1979 Ordinance did not obligate the City
to purchase the system at the end of the first 20-year period; rather, it provided an option
to purchase, which calls for the City to weigh the considerations and make a policy
judgment on whether to undertake the utility operations. In other words, by passing the
resolution authorizing the purchase, the City Council was not merely carrying out a
predetermined course of action. Instead, it was making the significant policy
determination of a "permanent or general character" that the City should purchase a
system, make the requisite budget expenditures to carry out the purchase, dedicate the
necessary time and personnel not only to carry out the purchase and undertake to
administer the utility system thereafter. The City does not now own and operate its own
electric distribution system, which is the activity the City Council has now voted to
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undertake. For these reasons, the City Council's resolution constitutes a legislative action
that is subject to the referendum process. See, e.g., Reagan v. City ofSausalito, 210 Cal.
App. 2d 618 (1962) (holding that City Council's resolution to acquire property was a
legislative act, subject to referendum); City of Mission v. Abourezk, 318 N.W. 2d 124
(S.D. 1982) (referendum used to challenge City Council's resolution to purchase certain
real estate).
The type of actions which should be considered administrative, and thus not
subject to referenda, include "the settlement of lawsuits, entering of contracts, acceptance
or rejection of bids, sale of municipal bonds, appointment of city officials, levying of
taxes, granting of licenses and permits, and the adoption of budgets." Hanson v. City of
Granite Falls, 529 N.W. 2d 485, 488 (Ct. App. Minn. 1995). Here, the City's decision to
purchase the utility distribution system does not resemble the type of administrative
actions enumerated above.
These facts demonstrate that the proposed purchase is not merely administrative.
It is a legislative act that will substantially affect residents of the City. Consequently,
they should be allowed to express their will on whether the purchase should occur and
that will should be followed. For these reasons, the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on this ground should be reversed.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT SUBMITTING THE ISSUE TO THE PUBLIC FOR A
REFERENDUM VOTE WOULD VIOLATE THE UNITED STATES
AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS.

The City Defendants argued below that even if the trial court concluded the
decision to purchase the system was legislative, and therefore subject to a referendum, an
election was still not appropriate because allowing the City residents to vote on whether
the City should purchase the system would interfere with its contract with the owner in
violation of United States Constitution, Article I, § 10 and Utah Constitution, Article I, §
18 ("Contract Clauses"). The trial court agreed and alternatively granted summary
judgment on that ground in favor of the City on its referendum counterclaim. The
evidence, however, established that no contract right of the City would be impaired even
if the City residents voted against acquiring the system.
Contrary to arguments by the City, Resolution 2000-2 is of no consequence
because it expresses only the City's intent to exercise the option to purchase. It creates no
legal obligations by the City to the owner. The May 12, 2000 Contract between the City
and the owner is the document that establishes those obligations. It states:
If a REFERENDUM election relating to the purchase of the SYSTEM is held,
either as a result of the judicial disposition or by agreement of the parties to the
LITIGATION, and . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is upheld, then the closing shall be scheduled for 60 days from the date of
the election; or . . . the result of the election is that MONTICELLO Resolution
2000-2 is rescinded, and/or the citizens vote that the City shall not purchase the
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SYSTEM, then EMPIRE'S franchise under Ordnance 79-11 shall be extended for
20 years subject pursuant to Ordinance 79-11.
(Contract, H 3.)
The Contract expressly provides that if the City cannot purchase the system as a
result of a referendum election, the owner's franchise would be renewed for another 20
years. Because the agreement between the City and the owner contains a provision which
would not subject the City to damages if the purchase could not be completed because of
the results of a referendum election, there can be no impairment of contract under the
Contract Clauses of either the United States or Utah Constitutions by holding one.
Moreover, even if the results of a referendum election did expose the City to a
claim by the owner for breach of contract, the City should not be allowed to execute a
contract inconsistent with its statutory obligations and contrary to the will of the people
and then hide behind that contract to bind the citizens to a purchase they may not wish to
undertake. To allow such a result would undermine the very purpose of the referendum
process: to ensure governmental actions are not made without the consent of the
governed. Consequently, the trial court's conclusion that allowing a referendum would
violate the Contract Clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions is erroneous and
should be reversed.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT THE CITY DEFENDANTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
MUNICIPAL BOND ACT.

The Citizens asserted a claim that the City Defendants violated the Municipal
Bond Act by misrepresenting to City residents in the notice of intent to issue bonds the
principal and interest necessary to finance the purchase. The City Defendants argued
below that publication of that information was optional under § 11-14-21, not mandatory.
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment on that claim in favor of the City
Defendants. The trial court's conclusion is erroneous.
The City initially attempted to finance the purchase of the system through the use
of revenue bonds, which do not require a vote of City residents to approve, but do require
proper notice to the public and an unconditional letter of legality from bond counsel
before approval by the lender. Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21, which governs the issuance
of such bonds, states:
In case of a resolution or other proceeding providing for the issuance of
bonds, the governing body may, in lieu of publishing the entire resolution or
other proceeding, publish a notice of bonds to be issued, titled as such,
containing:
(a) the name of the issuer;
(b) the purpose of the issue;
(c ) the type of bonds and the maximum principal amount which may
be issued;
(d) the maximum number of years over which the bonds may
mature;
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(e) the maximum interest rate which the bonds may bear, if any;
(f) the maximum discount from par, expressed as a percentage of
principal amount, at which the bands may be sold; and
(g) the times and place where a copy of the resolution or other
proceeding may be examined, which shall be at an office of the
issuer, identified in the notice, during regular business hours of the
issuer as described in the notice and for a period of at least 30 days
after the publication of the notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21(3).
There was no dispute below that the City published a notice of its intent to issue
the bonds on March 1 and 2, 2000 or that the notice represented the interest rate for the
bonds would be no greater than 6.75 percent and the total amount bonded would be $2.78
million. It was also undisputed that the City only intended to issue bonds for only $2.3
million and that only $1.48 million of that total would qualify for the 6.75% interest rate.
The remaining $1.3 million would be subject to a higher interest rate, which also would
have increased the total amount bonded. Consequently, the City misrepresented to its
residents in both the notice of intent to issue and in the information on file with the City
the maximum interest rate and maximum principal amount of the bonds. Consequently,
the notice to the public did not comply with §11-14-21(3) and the City cannot issue the
proposed revenue bonds based on that notice.
The express language of the statute demonstrates why the trial court's conclusion
that the City had the option, not the duty, to publish information on interest rate and
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principal amount in the notice of intent. It states the City may in lieu of publishing the
entire resolution publish a notice of intent. In other words, it requires the City to either
publish the resolution or a notice of intent. The publication of at least one is mandatory.
The only option is which one, for good reason. City residents have a right to know to
what indebtedness the City is subjecting them so that they might have the opportunity to
object under the procedures granted to them by law. Once the City chose to publish the
notice of intent instead of the entire resolution, was statutorily obligated to disclose the
accurate information required by § 11-14-21. It failed to do so and, therefore, violated the
Municipal Bond Act.
Interestingly, when the City Defendants learned they could not issue the revenue
bonds in time to complete the transaction by the desired closing date, they attempted to
obtain alternative financing through a twenty-year purchase lease arrangement with
Zion's bank. Under that arrangement, Zion's would have provided the City financing to
purchase the system. The City then would sell the system to Zion's and lease it back
from them. Those arrangements were all done without the public's knowledge and in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-16, which requires a vote by the citizens. It states:
In case a majority of the qualified electors of any city or town voting thereon at
any general election or special election called for that purpose shall vote in favor
of selling or leasing any property mentioned in Section 10-7-15, the board of
commissioners, city council or board of trustees, as the case may be, shall cause
notice to be given by publication thereof for at least twenty days in a newspaper
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published or having general circulation in the city or town, giving a general
description of the property to be sold or leased, and specifying the time when
sealed bids for the said property, or for a lease thereon, will be received, and the
time when and the place where the same will be opened.
Had the Citizens not filed this action when they did and discovered the City Defendants'
covert attempts to obtain alternative financing through the purchase-lease arrangement,
the City likely would have closed on the purchase with the owner in violation of § 10-716. This is further evidence that the City Defendants acted in contravention of the law
and contrary to the will of the people on numerous occasions to facilitate a purchase that
many of the residents did not favor. It renders the intentions of the City Defendants
suspect and provides further context to the consequences of the City Defendants'
violation of the Municipal Bond Act. Consequently, the trial court's conclusion that the
City Defendants did not violate that section should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY CONCLUDING AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT VARIOUS PROCEDURAL OBSTACLES
BARRED THE CITIZENS' ATTEMPT TO ENJOIN THE CITY FROM
VIOLATING THE MUNICIPAL BOND ACT.

The City Defendants argued below that even if they may have violated the
Municipal Bond Act, the Citizens could not obtain the relief they sought for three
reasons: the City Defendants are immune from such claims under the Governmental
Immunity Act, § 63-30-1, tt seq.; 2) the Citizens' claim is not ripe; and 3) the Citizens
lack standing to assert such a claim. The trial court agreed and alternatively granted
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summary judgment on each of those grounds in favor of the City on the Citizens5
Municipal Bond Act claim. The trial court's conclusions are erroneous for several
reasons.
It is well established under Utah law that the Governmental Immunity Act does not
apply to claims for equitable relief. American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1992) ("This court long has recognized a common law exception to
governmental immunity for equitable claims.") (citing El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v.
Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) mdAuerbach v. Salt Lake County, 63
P. 907 (1901)). Because Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the City Defendants from closing on
the purchase as a result of violating the Municipal Bond Act, they are not entitled to
immunity. The reason for the exception from immunity is well founded. An injunction is
a time sensitive request that simply cannot fall victim to the notice requirement of the act
and still retain any efficacy. It is counter intuitive of the very purpose of the injunction.
Consequently, the trial court's ruling that the City is immune was erroneous.
The trial court's conclusion that the Municipal Bond Act claim was not ripe was
also wrong. "Ripeness occurs when 'a conflict over the application of a legal provision
[has] sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between
the parties thereto.'" Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (quoting Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm }n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1148
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(Utah 1981)) (alteration in original). That is precisely what has occurred in this case.
The City published a notice of intent setting forth the information required by the
Municipal Bond Act - information that must be published before the City may issue any
bonds to finance the proposed purchase of the system. Some of the information given,
however, was wrong. Even though the Citizens informed the City Defendants of the
discrepancy, the City Defendants affirmed their intent to issue the bonds. This is not a
case where the trial court was asked to speculate about the facts and make a determination
on those facts. All of the facts necessary to a determination have occurred.
Consequently, the Citizens' claim under the Municipal Bond Act is ripe and the trial
court's conclusion to the contrary should be reversed.
Finally, the trial court's conclusion that the Citizens lack standing to assert a claim
for a violation of the Municipal Bond Act is erroneous. The Municipal Bond Act
expressly states, u[A]ny person in interest may contest... any bonds which may be
authorized by such resolution or proceeding . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-21(4). The
Citizens have an interest in whether the bonds are issued to pay for the proposed purchase
because it will affect their utility rates. Consequently, the Municipal Bond Act clearly
gives the Citizens standing to assert a violation of that section. Consequently, the trial
court's conclusion that the Citizens lack standing should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Citizens respectfully request that the Court
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, reverse the trial
court's denial of the Citizens' cross-motion for summary judgment and direct the trial
court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Citizens, declaring that the purchase of
the system is a legislative act, the referendum is required to be placed on the ballot in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-102(3) and the City is enjoined in the purchase
until such time as the referendum vote is tallied and results are certified in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. §20A-7-610.
DATED this /&

day of August, 2001.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

R. Brent Stephens
Heather S. White
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
N \20618\1\HSWVAPPBRF WPD
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Art. I, § 10

S t a t e m e n t and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
18.1 No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States: and no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust
under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
S e c 10. [ P o w e r s d e n i e d t h e s t a t e s . ]
11.1 No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit
bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender
in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, as post facto
law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility.
{2.1 No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and
t h e net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Control of the Congress.
(3.1 No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
a n y duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, enter into any Agreements or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.
A R T I C L E II
[EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
Section
1. [The President.]
2. [Commander-in-Chief— Pardons — Treaties —Appointment of officers.]
3. [Miscellaneous powers and duties.)
4. Ilmpeachment.]
S e c t i o n 1. [The P r e s i d e n t . ]
[1.] The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
t h e United States of America. He shall hold his Office during
t h e Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President,
chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
12.1 Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
S t a t e may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit
under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
(3.1 [The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and
vote by Ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not
be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they
shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and
certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of
t h e United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The
President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the
greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such
Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors
appointed; and if there be more than one who have such
Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House
of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then
from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like
Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the president, the
Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each
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State having one Vote; and quorum for this Purpose shall
consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States,
and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice.
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person
having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be
the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more
who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by
Ballot the Vice President.!
[4.J The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
[5.1 No person except a natural-born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United States.
[6.] In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President, [and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.]
[7.1 The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased
nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within the Period any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
[8.] Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall
take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my
Ability, preserve, protect and defend t h e Constitution of the
United States."
S e c . 2.

[Commander-in-Chief — P a r d o n s — Treaties —
A p p o i n t m e n t of officers.]
[1.] The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices,
and he shall have power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
[2.] He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds
of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.
[3.| The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.
S e c . 3. [ M i s c e l l a n e o u s p o w e r s a n d d u t i e s . 1
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information
of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both

Art I, § 7

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

S e c 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
S e c . 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd s.s.)
S e c 9.

[Excessive bail a n d fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896
S e c . 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.
1896

S e c . 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
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or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1994
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech a n d of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
Sec. 22, [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section
25. [Publication of acts — Effective dates of acts.i
26. [Private laws forbidden.!
27. (Games of chance not authorized.]
28. [Special privileges forbidden.)
29. [Lending public credit forbidden — Exception.]
[Lending public credit forbidden — Exception.]
[Proposed.]
30. [Continuity in government.]
3 1 . [Additional compensation of legislators.]
32. [Appointment of additional employees — Legal counsel.]
33. [Legislative auditor appointed.]
Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House and
People.]
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested:
1. In a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be
designated the Legislature of the State of Utah.
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated:
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of the State
of Utah as may be provided by law, under such conditions and
in such manner and within such time as may be provided by
law, may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to
be submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection,
or may require any law passed by t h e Legislature (except
those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the members elected
to each house of the Legislature) to be submitted to the voters
of t h e State before such law shall take effect. Legislation
initiated to allow, limit, or prohibit the taking of wildlife or the
season for or method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon
approval of two-thirds of those voting.
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof as may be
provided by law, of any legal subdivision of the State, under
such conditions and in such manner and within such time as
may be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation
and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people of
said legal subdivision for approval or rejection, or may require
any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of said
legal subdivision to be submitted to the voters thereof before
such law or ordinance shall take effect.
1998
[Power vested in Senate, House and
People.] [Proposed.]
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall
be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in
Subsection (2).
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the
numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and
within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause
it to be submitted to the people for adoption upon
a majority vote of those voting on the legislation,
as provided by statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature,
except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of
the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the State,
as provided by statute, before the law may take
effect.
(ii) Nothwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or prohibit the taking
of wildlife or the season for or method of taking
wildlife shall be adopted upon approval of two-thirds
of those voting,
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the
numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within
the time provided by statute, may:
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Art. VI, § 8

(i) initiate any desired legislation and cuase it to
be submitted to the people of the county, city, or town
for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on
the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law
making body of the county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute,
before the law or ordinance may take effect.
[19991
Sec. 2. [Time of general sessions.]
Annual general sessions of the Legislature shall be held at
the seat of government and shall begin on the third Monday in
January.
1992
Sec. 3 . [Election of H o u s e m e m b e r s — Terms.]
(1) The members of the House of Representatives shall be
chosen biennially on even-numbered years by the qualified
voters of the respective representative districts, on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in November.
(2) Their term of office shall be two years from the first day
of J a n u a r y next after their election.
1992
Sec. 4. [Election of Senators — Terms.]
(1) T h e senators shall be chosen by t h e qualified voters of
the respective senatorial districts, a t the same times and
places as members of the House of Representatives.
(2) Their term of office shall be four years from the first day
of J a n u a r y next after their election.
(3) As nearly one-half as may be practicable shall be elected
in each biennium as the Legislature shall determine by law
with each apportionment.
1992 (3rd S.S.)
Sec. 5. [Who is eligible as a legislator.]
No person shall be eligible to the office of senator or
representative who is not: a citizen of the United States;
twenty-five years of age; a qualified voter in the district from
which the person is chosen; a resident of the state for three
consecutive years immediately prior to the last date provided
by statute for filing for the office; and a resident of the district
from which the person is elected for six consecutive months
immediately prior to the last date provided by statute for filing
for the office. No person elected to the office of senator or
representative shall continue to serve in that office after
ceasing to be a resident of the district from which elected.
1998

Sec. 6. [Who ineligible as legislator.]
No person holding any public office of profit or trust under
authority of the United States, or of this State, shall be a
member of the Legislature: Provided, That appointments in
the State Militia, and the offices of notary public, justice of the
peace, United States commissioner, and postmaster of the
fourth class, shall not, within the meaning of this section, be
considered offices of profit or trust.
1896
Sec. 7. [Ineligibility of member to office created at
term for w h i c h elected.]
No member of the Legislature, during the term for which he
was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office of
profit under this State, which shall have been created, or the
emoluments of which shall have been increased, during the
term for which he was elected.
1896
Sec. 8. [Privilege from arrest.]
Members of the Legislature, in all cases except treason,
felony or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest
during each session of the Legislature, for fifteen days next
preceding each session, and in returning therefrom; and for
words used in any speech or debate in either house, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
189«
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CITIES, COUNTIES, AND LOCAL TAXING UNITS

•-regularity or defect in the proceedings for their issuance
/e This act is intended to afford an alternative method
gnds3
the issuance of bonds by municipalities and shall not be so
i as to deprive any municipality of the right to issue
struCC
'bonds under authority of any other statute, but neverthethis act shall constitute full authority for the issue and
..tp of bonds by municipalities. The provisions of Section
•14-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall not be applicable to
Lads issued under this act. Any municipality subject to the
incisions of any budget law shall in its annual budget make
ijlper provision for the payment of principal and interest
rtrrently falling due on bonds issued hereunder, but no
ofovision need be made in any such budget prior to the
Sguance of the bonds for the issuance thereof or for the
eXpenditure of the proceeds thereof. No ordinance, resolution
0T proceeding in respect to the issuance of bonds hereunder
jhall be necessary except as herein specifically required, nor
ihall the publication of any resolution, proceeding or notice
relating to the issuance of the bonds be necessary except as
herein required. Any publication made hereunder may be
nade in any newspaper conforming to the terms hereof in
which legal notices may be published under the laws of Utah,
without regard to the designation thereof as the official
journal or newspaper of the municipality. No resolution
adopted or proceeding taken hereunder shall be subject to
referendum petition or to an election other than as herein
required. All proceedings adopted hereunder may be adopted
OQ a single reading at any legally convened meeting of the
governing body.
1965

my

11-14-21. Publication of notice, resolution, or o t h e r
proceeding — Contest.
(1) If a municipality has one or more newspapers published
within its boundaries, the governing body of the municipality
shall, from time to time, designate one of the newspapers as
the "official newspaper" for the publication of all notices
required under this chapter. Otherwise, the governing body,
from time to time, shall designate a newspaper with general
circulation in the municipality as the "official newspaper" for
the publication of such notices.
(2) The governing body of any public body may provide for
the publication of any resolution or other proceeding adopted
by it under this chapter in the "official newspaper" designated
under Subsection (1).
<3) In case of a resolution or other proceeding providing for
&e issuance of bonds, the governing body may, in lieu of
publishing the entire resolution or other proceeding, publish a
aotice of bonds to be issued, titled as such, containing:
<a) the name of the issuer;
(b) the purpose of the issue;
<c) the type of bonds and the maximum principal
amount which may be issued;
*d) the maximum number of years over which the
bonds may mature;
<e) the maximum interest rate which the bonds may
bear, if any;
<f) the maximum discount from par, expressed as &
percentage of principal amount, at which the bonds may
be sold; and
(g) the times and place where a copy of the resolution
or other proceeding may be examined, which shall be at
an office of the issuer, identified in the notice, during
^Kular business hours of the issuer as described in the
notice and for a period of at least 30 days after the
Publication of the notice.
'*' For a period of 30 days after the publication any person
^•ntorest may contest the legality of such resolution or
deeding, any bonds which may be authorized by such
^lution or proceeding, or any provisions made for the
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11-14-27

security and payment of the bonds. After the 30-day period no
person may contest the regularity, formality, or legality of such
resolution or proceeding for any cause.
1987
11-14-22. Short title — Title to appear o n face of bonds
— Effect of future statutes dealing w i t h municipal bond issues.
This act may be cited as the "Utah Municipal Bond Act," all
bonds issued pursuant to authority contained in this act shall
contain on their face a recital to that effect, and no "act
hereafter passed by the legislature amending other acts under
which bonds authorized to be issued by this act might be
issued or dealing with bond issues of municipalities shall be
construed to affect the authority to proceed under this act in
the manner herein provided unless such future statute
amends this act and specifically provides that it is to be
applicable to bonds issued under this act.
1965
11-14-23. Exemptions from application of chapter —
Exception.
This chapter shall not apply to bonds issued by the state of
Utah nor to bonds or obligations payable solely from special
assessments levied on benefited property, except with respect
to Section 11-14-14.5 which shall have ge'neral application in
accordance with its terms.
I98i
11-14-24. Conflict of laws.
To the extent that any one or more provisions of this act
shall be in conflict with any other law or laws, the provisions
of this act shall he controlling.
u>6$
11-14-25. Separability clause.
If any one or more sentences, clauses, phrases, provisions or
sections of this act or the application thereof to any set of
circumstances shall be held by final judgment of any court of
competent jurisdiction to be invalid, the remaining sentences,
clauses, phrases, provisions and sections hereof and the application of this act to other sets of circumstances shall
nevertheless continue to be valid and effective, the legislature
hereby declaring that all provisions of this act are severable.
196$

11-14-26. Validity of prior bond issues.
All bonds issued by any municipality prior to the effective
date of this act and all proceedings had in the authorization
and issuance thereof are hereby validated, ratified and confirmed and all such bonds are declared to constitute legally
binding obligations in accordance with their terms. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to affect or validate any bonds,
the legality of which is being contested at the time this act
takes effect.
196$
11-14-27. Application of act.
Sections 11-14-2,11-14-4, 11-14-6, 11-14-7, 11-14-8, 11-14-9,
11-14-12, 11-14-15, and 11-14-18 shall apply to all bond
elections and to all bonds issued by any city, town, county,
school district, public transit district, improvement district
under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 3, special service district
operating under authority of the Utah Special Service District
Act, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district
and, except as otherwise provided in Section 11-14-23, by any
other taxing district or governmental entity whether or not
the bonds are issued pursuant to authority granted by this act
and, as to matters provided in Section 11-14-18, this act shall
apply to all bonds issued and outstanding as of May 11. 1965v
as well as to bonds issued after that date.
199?
CHAPTER 14a
NOTICE OF DEBT ISSUANCE
Section
ll-14a-l.

Notice of debt issuance.

20A-7-101

ELECTION CODE

Section
20A-7-607.
20A-7-608.
20A-7-609.
20A-7-610.
20A-7-61L
20A-7-612.

fication of signatures by the county clerks
— Transfer to local clerk.
Evaluation by the local clerk.
Ballot title — Duties of local clerk and local
attorney.
Form of ballot — Manner of voting.
Return and canvass — Conflicting measures
— Law effective on proclamation.
Effective date.
Misconduct of electors and officers — Penalty.
Part 7
Voter Information Pamphlet

20A-7-701.
20A-7-702.
20A-7-703.
20A-7-704.
20A-7-705.
20A-7-706.

Voter information pamphlet to be prepared.
Voter information pamphlet — Form — Contents — Distribution.
Impartial analysis of measure — Determination of fiscal effects.
Initiative measures — Arguments for and
against — Voters' requests for argument —
Ballot arguments.
Measures to be submitted to voters and referendum measures — Preparation of argument of adoption.
Copies of arguments to be sent to opposing
authors — Rebuttal arguments.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

20A-7-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Certified" means that the county clerk has acknowledged a signature as being the signature of a
registered voter.
(2) "Circulation" means the process of submitting an
initiative or referendum petition to legal voters for their
signature.
(3) "Initiative" means a new law proposed for adoption
by the public as provided in this chapter.
(4) "Initiative packet" means a copy of the initiative
petition, a copy of the proposed law, and the signature
sheets, all of which have been bound together as a unit.
(5) "Legal signatures" means the number of signatures
of legal voters that:
(a) meet the numerical requirements of this chapter; and
(b) have been certified and verified as provided in
this chapter.
(6) "Legal voter" means a person who:
(a) is registered to vote; or
(b) becomes registered to vote before the county
clerk certifies the signatures on an initiative or referendum petition.
(7) (a) "Local law" includes an ordinance, resolution,
master plan, and any comprehensive zoning regulations adopted by ordinance or resolution.
(b) "Local law" does not include individual property zoning decisions.
(8) "Local attorney" means the county attorney, city
attorney, or town attorney in whose jurisdiction a local
initiative or referendum petition is circulated.
(9) "Local clerk" means the county clerk, city recorder,
or town clerk in whose jurisdiction a local initiative or
referendum petition is circulated.
(10) "Local legislative body" means the legislative body
of a county, city, or town.
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(11) "Measure" means an initiative or referendum.
(12) "Referendum" means a law passed by the Leg
ture or by a local legislative body that is being submit
to the voters for their approval or rejection.
(13) "Referendum packet" means a copy of the refei
dum petition, a copy of the law being submitted to \
voters for their approval or rejection, and the signatuw
sheets, all of which have been bound together as a unit3
(14) "Signature sheets" means sheets in the form n*
quired by this chapter that are used to collect signature!
in support of an initiative or referendum.
*^
(15) "Sponsors" means the legal voters who support thj
initiative or referendum and who sign the application fi3
petition copies.
{j
(16) "Sufficient" means that the signatures submittal
in support of an initiative or referendum petition hav$
been certified and verified as required by this chapter. -4
(17) "Verified" means acknowledged by the person ON
culating the petition as required in Sections 20A-7-205
and 20A-7-305.
ini
20A-7-102. Initiatives and referenda authorized — Rtf
strictions.
By following the procedures and requirements of this
ter, Utah voters may, subject to the restrictions of Article
Sec. 1, Utah Constitution and this chapter:
(1) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to
submitted to:
.^j
(a) the Legislature or to a vote of the people log
approval or rejection if it is a proposed state law; or]
(b) a local legislative body or to a vote of the people^
if it is a local law;
^
(2) require any law passed by the Legislature, excegg
those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the member*
elected to each house of the Legislature, to be referred t$
the voters for their approval or rejection before the laie
takes effect; and
*%
(3) require any law or ordinance passed by a local
legislative body to be referred to the voters for theft!
approval or rejection before the law takes effect.
I9i<
20A-7-103. Constitutional amendments and oth<
questions — Procedures for submission Ui
popular vote.
J
(1) The procedures contained in this section govern wherid
(a) the Legislature submits a proposed constitutional
amendment or other question to the voters; and
(b) an act of the Legislature is referred to the voters by
referendum petition.
**
(2) The lieutenant governor shall, not later than 60 dayi
before the regular general election, publish the full text of ttf^
amendment, question, or statute in at feast one newspaperin_
every county of the state where a newspaper is published, *
(3) The legislative general counsel shall:
<ii
(a) designate the amendment or question by numbflfi
and order of presentation on the ballot;
# ^
(b) draft and designate a ballot title that summarise^
the subject matter of the amendment or question; and *j
(c) deliver them to the lieutenant governor.
JjS
(4) The lieutenant governor shall certify the number ang
ballot title of each amendment or question to the county &**%
of each county no later than the second Friday after t«L
primary election.
M
(5) The county clerk of each county shall:
£§
(a) ensure that both the number and title of the amenws
ment, question, or referendum is printed on the sampwjj
ballots and official ballots; and
ib) publish them as provided by law.

10-7-11
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10-7-11. Failure to p a y for service — Termination.
In case the owner of any of the premises mentioned in
Section 10-7-10, or the tenant or occupant, shall fail to pay for
water furnished such owner, tenant or occupant, according to
such ordinances, rules or regulations enacted or adopted, the
city or town may cause the water to be shut off from such
premises, and shall not be required to turn the same on again
until all arrears for water furnished shall be paid in full.
19SS

10-7-12. Scarcity of w a t e r — Limitation o n u s e .
In the event of scarcity of water the mayor of any city or the
president of the board of trustees of any town may, by
proclamation, limit the use of water for any purpose other
than domestic purposes to such extent as may be required for
the public good in the judgment of the board of commissioners
or city council of any city or the board of trustees of any town.
1953

10-7-13. Right of e n t r y o n p r e m i s e s of w a t e r user.
All authorized persons connected with the waterworks of
any city or town shall have the right to enter upon any
premises furnished with water by such city or town to examine
the apparatus, the amount of water used and the manner of
use, and to make all necessary shutoffs for vacancy, delinquency or violation of the ordinances, rules or regulations
enacted or adopted by such city or town.
1953
10-7-14. R u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s for u s e of water.
Every city and town may enact ordinances, rules and
regulations for the management and conduct of the waterworks system owned or controlled by it.
1953
10-7-14.1. D e c l a r a t i o n of public policy.
Whereas, the purification of drinking water and the treatment of raw sewage are important to public health and
welfare and create an unusual need for money with which to
create proper facilities for the protection of the people of the
state of Utah, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of
this state to grant the privilege to municipalities to raise funds
to improve the aforementioned health standards, to encourage
the municipalities to provide that no waste shall be discharged
into any waters of the state of Utah without first being given
proper treatment, to provide for the treatment of water to be
used for drinking purposes to protect the health of the citizens
and to give municipalities the discretion to determine the
priority of development of the facilities directed toward the
elimination of health hazards and pollution of public waters.
The construction of the facilities herein mentioned shall be
given an early priority in those areas where the present
welfare of the people is endangered by the lack of such
facilities.
1953 u«t S.S.)
10-7-14.2. S p e c i a l t a x — Grant of p o w e r to levy.
There is granted to the municipalities of the state not in an
improvement district created for the purpose of establishing
and maintaining a sewage collection, treatment, or disposal
system or a system for the supply, treatment, or distribution of
water pursuant to the provisions of Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part
3, in addition to all other rights of assessment, the right to levy
a tax annually not to exceed .0008 per dollar of taxable value
of taxable property in the municipality. The money raised by
the levy shall be placed in a special fund and used only for the
purpose of financing the construction of facilities to purify the
drinking water of the municipality and the construction of
facilities for the treatment and disposal of the sewage of the
municipality, or to pay principal and interest on bonds issued
for the construction of facilities if construction has actually
commenced subsequent to the enactment of this statute. The
municipality may accumulate from year to year and reserve in
the special fund the money raised for this purpose. The levy
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shall be made and collected in the same manner as othej
property taxes are levied and collected by municipalities. $m

i»H
10-7-14.3. Time limit for c i t i e s of first class.
In cities of the first class the authority to levy an additional
.0008 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property above t l 3
overall limitation provided by Section 10-6-133 shall be lima
ited to a period of ten years from the date of the first levy.

ARTICLE 4
SALE OR LEASE OF POWER PLANTS
10-7-15. Submitting p r o p o s i t i o n to electors.
Whenever in the judgment of the board of commissioners!
city council of any city, or the board of trustees of any town jjH
shall be deemed advisable to sell or lease the works or platir^
constructed, purchased or used by such city or town for
purpose of generating or distributing electrical energy
light, heat or power purposes, such board of commissioners
city council or board of trustees, as the case may be, shiug
cause an appraisement of the property proposed to be sold\
leased to be made by three resident taxpayers of such citylH
town, to be appointed by the commissioners, city c o u n c i l «
board of trustees, and shall provide for submitting the quelj|
tion of the sale or lease of such property to the qualifii
electors of such city or town as shall have paid a property t i n
in the year preceding such election, at the next general
election or at a special election called for that purpose. S u g g
election shall be called and conducted in the same manner i
provided by statute for the issue of bonds in Section 10-7-8, t h ^
necessary changes in the form of the ballot being made, n
10-7-16. Call for bids — N o t i c e — Contents.
In case a majority of the qualified electors of any city or t
voting thereon at any general election or special election callfj
for that purpose shall vote in favor of selling or leasing i
property mentioned in Section 10-7-15, the board of comn
sioners, city council or board of trustees, as the case may 1
shall cause notice to be given by publication thereof for at le
twenty days in a newspaper published or having gene
circulation in the city or town, giving a general description^
the property to be sold or leased, and specifying the time whtf
sealed bids for the said property, or for a lease thereon, will t
received, and the time when and the place where the same? "
be opened.
l
10-7-17.

Opening of b i d s — A m o u n t to equal appra
value and a m o u n t of o u t s t a n d i n g bonds.
At the time and place mentioned in such notice all
received for the property sought to be sold or leased shall 4
opened and considered, and the commissioners, city council|
trustees shall accept the bid of the highest responsible bidd
provided, that such bid, if for the purchase of the worksj
plant, is for an amount equal to the appraised value there
and in the judgment of the commissioners, city councilJ|
board of trustees is an adequate price for the said prop
and provided further, that no offer to purchase the worksj
plant shall be accepted which does not amount to the f
outstanding bonds sold for the purpose of constructing}
same, together with accumulated interest thereon.
10-7-18. Disposition of m o n e y s received.
All moneys received from the sale of property as in
article provided shall be kept in a separate fund, and shall l
be expended, or mixed with other funds of such city or to*
until all bonds sold for the purchase or construction of so
plant or works, together with accumulated interest therr
shall have first been paid; provided, that where the prop
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Randy T. Austin (6171)
Matthew K. Richards (7972)
KJRTON &McCONKJE
Attorneys for Defendants
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING PLAINTIFFS* CROSS
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

ROBERT LOW, JOEL PALMER, JULIA
REDD, ALBERT STEELE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 0007-65-

CITY OFMONT1CELLO,K..DALE
w AOL DOUGLAS ALLEN, JULIE

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

I R S I KIM BUKTENSHAW
CLYDE CHRISTENSEN, EVAN LOWRY,
C. TRENT SCHAFER,
Defendants.
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Christensen & Martineau, Defendants were represented by Randy T. Austin and Matthew K.
Richards of Kirton & McConkie. Based on the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to
the Motions, the arguments of counsel and good cause appearing therefore and for the reasons set
forth in the Court's memorandum decision issued October 27, 2000:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiffs'

first claim for relief for violation of the Municipal Bond Act and the Notice of Debt Issuance Act
in its entirety. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' First Claim for relief is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part with respect to

Plaintiffs' second claim for relief for violation of the Open and Public Meeting Act. Plaintiffs
have conceded that no final action related to the repurchase was taken in a closed session.
Therefore, the Court rules that no actions taken by the Defendant City related to the repurchase of
the electrical system are subject to being voided.
3.

Plaintiffs' claim for relief seeking to void final actions is therefore dismissed with

prejudice. The Court takes under advisement Plaintiffs* claim which alleges that the Monticello
City Council's discussions in closed sessions shouldbe publicly disclosed The Court reserves
any ruling with respect to this portion of the claim, pending an in camera review of the minutes
and tape recordings of the closed meetings. The sole remedy remaining for Plaintiffs on this
claim is for the Court to order public disclosure of information should any violation be found.
4.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment is denied with respect to Defendant's Counterclaim in its entirety.
2
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The Court rules that the purchase of the electrical system is an administrative decision not subject
to referendum. The Court rules in the alternative that submission of the City's decision to
repurchase the electrical system to a referendum vote would violate the United States and Utah
Constitutions. Therefore, the Court orders that a referendum not be held on this issue.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT judgment be entered on Plaintiffs' first claim for
relief; that portion of the second claim for relief for which summary judgment is granted in
Defendants' favor, and Defendants' Counterclaim- Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedures
54, and for the reasons underlying the Court's granting of Defendants1 Motion for Expedited
Review as set forth in the memorandum decision, the Court determines there is no just reason for
delay in the entry of final judgment on these claims
DATED this /&

day ffifovember,

,j£d*t
BY THE COURT:
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County

-"!LED
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

OCT 3 1 2000
JLERK OF THE COURT

•Sr.
(DEPUTY

$y

ROBERT LOW, JOEL PALMER,
JULIA REDD, ALBERT STEELE,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

CITY OF MONTICELLO, KL DALE
BLACK, DOUGLAS ALLEN, JULIE
BRONSON, KTMBURTENSHAW,
CLYDE CHRISTENSEN, EVAN
LOWRY, C. KENT SCHAFER,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
and CROSS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT and
REQUEST FOR IN CAMERA
INSPECTION and MOTION
FOR EXPEDITED REVJJEW
Civil No. 0007-65
Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary
Judgmentfor Partial Summary Judgment came on regularly for oral argument on October 19,
2000. The court took the matter under advisement and has read the memorandum and pleadings
and has considered the arguments of counsel and now issues this ruling.

I. Ruling on Motion for Expedited Review
The motion for expedited review is granted for the reasons that (1) Plaintiffs allege that
additional costs offinancingthe repurchase of the power distribution system will accrue to the
City of Monticello unless expedited review is granted, and (2) Defendants allege that if the
request for a referendum is granted it should be done quickly to accommodate the upcoming
election.
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-2II. Ruling on Motion for In Camera Inspection
The motion requesting an in camera inspection of tape recordings of closed meetings held
by the City of Monticello is granted.

IE. Rulings on Defendants' Motion for Suramaiy Judgment
The Defendants' motion asserts the following:
A. Plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Municipal bond Act fails as a matter of law;
The defendants are immune, the claim is unripe and lacks substantive merit,
and plaintiffs lack standing.
B. Plaintiffs claim under the Open and Public Meetings Act fails because
plaintiffs cannot produce facts to support their allegations, and the Plaintiffs did not
file a mandatory Notice of Claim,
C. A referendum regarding the City's decision to repurchase the electrical
system would violate constitutional law.
The defendants' motion seeks partial summary judgment with respect to the referendum
issue raised in the defendants' Counterclaim.
(A). Does the PJfljptiflfc' f!tajm Under The Municipal Bond Act Fail?
The plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief claims that the defendants violated the "Utah
Municipal Bond Act," or in the alternative, have attempted to issue debt without complying with
the "Notice of Debt Issuance Act." The defendants move for summary judgment on the First
Claim for Relief on the basis that (1) the Utah governmental Immunity Act immunizes cities and
their employees from suits arising out of a "governmental function," (2) the plaintiffs' claim
under the Utah Municipal Bond Act (the "Act") is not ripe, and (3) the plaintiffs lack standing to
assert the First Claim for Relief. The court notes in passing that the plaintiffs' memorandum in
39
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-3rcsponse did not address these issues.
1. Is the City Immune? It is clear that the Governmental Immunity Act immunizes cities
and their employees, including officers and Board Members,fromsuits arisingfromthe exercise
of a governmental function. The question therefore presented is whether the act of repurchasing
a power distribution system is a governmental function.
A governmental function is defined by Sec. 63-30-2 (4) (a) U.C.A. as ".. .any act... or
undertaking of a governmental entity . . whether or not the a c t . . . or undertaking is characterized
as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government,. .. essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could.be performed by a private
enterprise or private persons."
Applying this definition, the court is persuaded that the city's decision and actions to
repurchase the power distribution system is a governmental function, thus cloaking the city and
its employees with immunityfromsuit.
2. Is the Claim Ripe? The plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief also contends that the City
intends to issue financial obligations which are totally separate and distinct from the Electric
Revenue bonds already noticed by the City in a notice entitled "Notice of Bonds to Be Issued11
and which is dated April 12, 2000. However, the court notes that the claim complains of
anticipated future financing. The Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that any future debt
instruments will be issued by the City without following the notice provisions required by law.
Furthermore, the City has disclaimed any intent to issue new debt instruments for which it has
not already given notice. The court therefore finds that the claim is premature and unripe in that
there is not a concrete, imminent threat that a note or bond will issue in violation of the Bond Act
sufficient to grant an injunction, either preliminary or permanent.
3. Do Plaintiffs have Standing? A resident of a municipality is entitled to contest a City's
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-4issuance of bonds within 30 days of when notice of the city's resolution or proceeding
authorizing bonds is published. (See U.C.A, 11-14-21 (4)). However, in this instance the
plaintiffs seek to maintain an action to prevent the issuance of debt instruments not already
noticed and they therefore lack standing.
4. Compliance with Municipal Bond Act? The plaintiffs assert three areas in which the
defendants have or will violate the law relating to municipal bonding: (1) by publishing incorrect
information in its bond notice; (2) by improperly pursuing options for a Purchase Lease
Agreement with Zions Bank; and (3) by failing to provide notice of the "Private Activity Bond,"
(a). The court rejects the notion that the published notice was improper because it was
inaccurate as to the interest rate and the principal amount involved. U.C.A. 11-14-21(2) and (3)
provide that a city may provide for the publication of a notice relating to the bonds . Because
publication of a notice was optional, not mandatory, the City's publication of a bond notice that
may have misstated the interest rate and the principal amount is not a violation of the code
section.
The plaintiffs cite UCA 1 l-14a-l as authority for their proposition that the Lease-Purchase
agreement with Zions Bank violated the law. This section addresses "new debt resolution11
which authorizes a resolution to fond a "rejected" project. The statute further defines a "rejected
project" as one for which voter approval for a general obligation bond was sought but which did
not receive the required approval. In this instance the anticipated bonds were revenue bonds
which were to be paid from the revenues of the electrical system. Accordingly, the City was not
required to seek voter approval for revenue bond and the project was therefore not a "rejected
project."
The court also finds that the Private Activity Bonds are a portion of the electric Revenue
Bonds were not required to be noticed.
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-5(b). Because the City seeks tofinancethe purchase of the system through a revenue bond,
no election is necessary to approve the City's issuance of the bonds. The bonds to be repaid will
be repaid through a "special fund" arising out of the operational revenues of the electrical system
and the Supreme Court has held that repayment through a special fund does not create
"indebtedness" in excess of the current year's taxes.
5. Notice of Debt Issuance Act: The courtfindsthat the Notice of Debt Issuance Act is
inapplicable to the instant case because the Act only applies when a municipality determines to
pursue a project despite a bond election where the voters rejected the bond. No allegation has
been made that such an election has been held.
Based on the foregoing, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs'
First Claim for Relief

(BV Ruling on Open and Public Meetings Act.
At oral argument the plaintiffs stipulated that they do not claim any majorfinalaction that
needs to be voided was made in a closed meeting regarding the decision to repurchase the
electrical distribution system.
The court rejects the defendants1 argument that it was mandatory for the plaintiffs to file a
Notice of Claim prior to filing their complaint The court therefore will take under advisement
whether there were other discussions that took place in a closed session that should be disclosed
to the public. For this purpose, the court will conduct an in camera inspection of the minutes of
the closed meetings and will issue a separate memorandum decision in due course on that issue.

(C). Is the City's Decision to Repurchase the System the Proper Subject of a
Referendum, and Would the Referendum Violate the Contracts Clause?
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-6The undisputed facts show that on April 24,2000, the City Recorder certified that 349
signatures on a petition belonged to registered voters in Monticello and was sufficient to submit
the issue to a vote of the people "if required by law." The City Attorney prepared the ballot title
but expressed doubt as to whether the resolution to repurchase the system was a proper subject
for a referendum petition. On June 29, 2000, the City Recorder formally informed the petition
sponsors that a referendum would not be held.
The plaintiffs allege in paragraph 21 of their complaint that the "... citizens of Monticello
will have the opportunity at a special election to determine whether the residents and voters of
the City of Monticello want the city to purchase the electric distribution system or not." The
defendant Monticello City filed a Counterclaim disputing this allegation and now requests the
court to enter summary judgment on the Counterclaim because (1) the city's decision to
repurchase the distribution system is not the proper subject of a referendum, and (2) even if the
referendum were proper, and if a majority of voters disapproved the repurchase, the referendum
would violate the Contracts Clause of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
1. Administrative or Legislative: The parties are agreed that the decision as to whether a
referendum on this issue is proper is dependent upon whether the court characterizes the action of
the City Council in repurchasing the electrical distribution system as an "administrative" or
"legislative" function. The Supreme Court of Utah has declared that a legislative act is "one
making a new law" which "relate[s] to subjects of a permanent or general character" and
"constitutes a declaration of public purposes and makfes] provisions of ways and means of
accomplishment .." Keiglev v. Bench 89 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1939).

And in Wilson v.

Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 253 (Utah 1982) the court described an administrative act as "one
executing a law already in existence" which was "clearly within the ambit of the voters' intention
when the original ordinance was adopted. .. [and] is pursuant to the intended purpose and policy

-7cxpressed by the voters,. /
Applying these tests, the court is persuaded that the act of passing Resolution 2000-2 was an
administrative act - not legislative - and is therefore not subject to refcreadum. The resolution is
not a new law of a permanent character, but is temporary. The original decision to provide
power to the community was a permanent decision made long before the system was sold in
1979, but the decision of how the City would fulfill that obligationfromyear to year is an
administrative decision temporary in nature. There is nothing in the repurchase that would
preclude the City from divesting itself of the distribution system at some time in the future if
circumstances warranted.
2. Contracts Clause: The court alsofindsthat it would violate the contracts clause of the
Utah and United States Constitutions to allow a referendum that would have the possible effect
of interfering with the "contract" created between the City and Empire Electric by the passage of
Resolution 2000-2. The option contract became absolute and binding upon passage of the
resolution and a referendum vote to rescind the resolution would impermissibly impair the
contract. Further, the proposed purchase merely seeks to execute a law already in existence and
merely pursues the plan long ago adopted by the City Council to provide power to the City's
residents.
Based on the foregoing, the defendants3 motion for summary judgment on the issue of a
referendum is granted and the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on that issue is
denied.
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare a summary judgment consistent with this ruling.
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